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ABSTRACT 
 
During the 1990s employment relations systems in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
experienced a complex, multilevel process of transformation. In this article, we discuss the 
transformation of employment relations systems under the impact of privatization, foreign direct 
investment, and pressures for the accession to the European Union enlargement at the enterprise, 
industry-, and national levels. We argue that the pattern of embeddedness of ER in the former 
planned economic system, the developmental role of the state during the period of transition and 
the timing of the changes at a moment of intensified international competition resulted into 
unique configurations of employment relations in the different CEE countries, not necessarily 
converging toward the incremental adjustments of Western European employment relations..  
Key factors bound to further introduce transformations convergent with Western ER models 
include the growing presence of multinational companies and the perspective of the EU 
enlargement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
Employment relations (ER) are widely recognized as key components of the national 
business systems and the distinctive, structural characteristics they imprinted to various Western 
economies have been extensively analyzed (Whitley, 1999). By contrast, the analysis of ER 
systems has received little systematic attention in the context of the CEE (Central and Eastern 
Europe) economies. This is due in part to the lack of adequate theoretical frameworks to address 
their organizational evolution from planned to market economies and in part to the scarcity of 
reliable comparative data across a region undergoing swift transformation. Understanding their 
specific origins and dynamics would shed light on an important element of the emerging CEE 
business systems.  
 
The existing literature on the transformation of ER in CEE can be divided between 
micro-level approaches that analyze the transformation of ER as part and parcel of the changes in 
the structure and practices of the enterprise, and approaches that view the transformation of ER 
as part of the macro-institutional change that characterized the ‘transition’ decade. The first 
approach focuses on the restructuring of the human resources (HR) managerial practices; the 
second analyzes the organization of labor and employers’ interests in unions and employers’ 
organizations, and the repositioning of the State on labor governance issues. Both approaches 
emphasize that, with some variation from country to country, a weak institutional demarcation 
between labor and management represented the starting point in the formation of new systems of 
ER in CEE. In the absence of a well-identified labor-management divide and of the 
corresponding Western institutions of labor governance, existing Western ER theories and 
models provide only limited insight into the processes of ER transformation in CEE.   
 
At the enterprise level, privatization brought the issue of labor governance at the 
forefront, but its speed and inevitability did not close the institutional gap between the Western 
and Eastern structures of ER. Above the enterprise level, corporatist views in the European 
continental tradition, placing unions and their hierarchical, cross-industry organization at the 
core of the ER systems faced the legacy of unions as ‘transmission belt mechanisms’ – state-
controlled institutions “with integrative structures and functions” (Poole, 1986: 117). 
Nevertheless, what we observe is that in spite of diffuse and largely informal webs of labor-
management relationships inherited from the period of planned economy, a process of formal 
institutional differentiation of management and labor become clear post 1989.  
 
There exists a rich literature on the employment relations (ER) systems of the different 
CEE countries. However, most studies tend to focus on one country at a time and examine a 
particular stage or factor of transformation.  In this article, we propose an analytic framework to 
systematically study the transformation of ER systems in CEE. Our goal is to identify and outline 
the existing trends in the evolution of ER systems, at a time when most of the CEE countries are 
concluding a difficult period of transition to market economies and are preparing for integration 
into the European Union (EU). In this context, our analysis focuses on both the structural and 
policy consequences of these processes for the transformation of ER.  
 
With restricted autonomy and distorted functions during the period of planned economy, 
ER in CEE experienced a complex, multilevel process of transformation during the 1990s. In 
order to understand the breadth of this transformation, we conduct our analysis at distinct 
analytic levels and, in line with the comparative literature in industrial relations, we decompose 
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the process of change in its level-specific mechanisms and results (Locke and Thelen, 1995; 
Regini, 2000). Specifically, we examine how planned economy organization (roughly set at pre-
1989) in CEE influenced market-economy ER and analyze how three country-specific factors 
might also influence market-economy ER characteristics.  These are the impact of privatization, 
foreign direct investment, and European integration at the enterprise-, industry-, and national 
levels.  We show that the pattern of embeddedness of ER in the former planned economic 
system, the developmental role of the state during the period of transition, and the timing of the 
changes at a moment of intensified international competition gave ER in CEE unique 
characteristics, not necessarily converging toward Western European models.  
 
In this article data and empirical evidence are mainly drawn from sources and the 
literature analyzing the following six countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Slovakia. Notwithstanding variation across countries, we believe that their ER 
systems display sufficient similarity to allow for a meaningful area analysis. Despite important 
socio-economic, cultural and historical differences, these countries had closely integrated 
economic systems during the period of planned economy and displayed certain simultaneity in 
the adoption of their general economic policies. After 1989, they were exposed to different 
pressures for economic restructuring and political transformation aimed to establish valid market 
economies. 
 
This article is organized as follows.  First, we present the analytical structure that is 
framing the entire paper.  Second, we discuss systematically the common factors defining ER 
under the planned economy and how they might have influenced future ER.  Third, we analyze 
change in the systems of ER in CEE triggered by privatization, foreign direct investment and 
accession to the European Union.  We conclude suggesting some potential trends in the 
transformation of ER in CEE.  
 
I.  A Proposed Analytic Framework for the Employment Relations Systems in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
 
To examine the transformation of ER systems in CEE we propose an analytic framework 
that emphasizes two key dimensions: 1) the dynamics of the process in time and 2) the 
structuring of a multilevel system of ER after 1989. The starting point of the transformation is 
the state of the system of ER as developed during the period of planned economy (roughly pre-
1989). With the transition to market economies, a multitude of factors, both domestic and 
international, influenced the multi-level structuration of new systems of ER across the region.  
 
We conceptualize the system of ER of the planned economy period as a largely domestic 
phenomena strongly controlled by State action. State intervention is shown to have pressed for 
weak differentiation between labor and management at the enterprise level and for labor 
governance institutions that suppressed the expression of conflict against both management and 
the State. This is exemplified in Figure 1.  
 
We argue that several key factors transformed the systems of ER in the post-1989 period 
as shown in the second part of Figure 1. We suggest that the weak management-labor divide of 
the planned economy lost ground after 1989 and that labor and management constituted 
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institutionally distinct domains. The three major factors of change most often identified in the 
literature are: 1) the processes of privatization, 2) foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
globalization, and, more recently, 3) the processes of adhesion to the EU and internalization of 
the EU requirements in the realm of ER.  
 
These forces impacted the various levels of the systems of ER with often contradictory 
dynamics, depending on the sensitivity to path-dependency across the levels of the ER systems. 
For instance, the efforts toward European integration manifested mainly at the national level and 
resulted in the birth of macro-level institutions (such as tripartite bodies) resembling the 
corporatist institutions of the West, while the effects of FDI in the realm of ER were, especially 
in the case of MNCs, mainly an enterprise phenomena (the reshaping of the HR managerial 
practices), with much less impact on national level institution building.   
 
Despite the fact that we follow a broad definition of employment relations as the 
“regulation or governance of the employment relationship” (Marginson and Sisson, 2002: 671), 
we believe that the specification of the level of analysis in the study of ER systems is important 
for a number of reasons. First, there is a tendency in the existing literature on ER in CEE to 
indistinctly use the concepts of labor and management to refer to classes or overarching social 
categories (with class identity often assumed), as well as to actors or stakeholders in the 
enterprise taken as a unit of analysis.  For instance, some authors examine labor governance 
problems and the clarification of labor’s position inside the enterprise (Martin, 1999), while 
others focus on societal corporatism, processes of democratization and the clarification of the 
labor class’ position in the society at large (Ost, 2000; Ost and Crowley, 2001). This might lead 
to a substantive problem, common in system approaches to the process of change: the lack or 
presence of change assessed at one level is assumed to characterize the entire system (Mayer and 
Whittington, 1999). Our conceptual clarification of the level of analysis in the study of the ER 
systems transformation in CEE allows for a better understanding of their overall restructuring 
and helps in the identification of the specific influence of the various factors of change. 
 
Second, although we make a path-dependency argument, meaning that we believe there is 
inertia in the process of change and that long-established and -enforced social mechanisms have 
the tendency to reproduce themselves under changed circumstances, we point out that each level 
of the ER system has different path-dependent sensitivity. For instance, although we argue that 
the change in the structure of property did not disturb the former managerial HR practices and 
routines in radical ways, we also show that privatization through foreign direct investment 
disrupted to a larger extent the existent HR practices than the insiders-dominated privatization 
methods did. Briefly stated, path-dependency takes place selectively and with different intensity 
across the levels of the ER systems.  
 
Third, our theoretical framework for comparative ER research in CEE stresses the need 
for identifying the ‘locus of conflict’, or the so-called ‘sticking points’ (i.e. critical, foundational 
issues defining actors’ identities) that characterize national systems of ER (Locke and Thelen, 
1995; Regini, 2000).  The “sticking points” approach argues that by identifying the locus of 
conflict in each particular ER system, the entire logic of national ER systems formation can be 
traced back and the understanding of the overall comparative picture can be refined. 
Nonetheless, given the insufficient conceptual clarification of the sets of elements and levels of 
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structuring of the ER systems in CEE, this methodology was so far restricted to the comparative 
ER research of advanced industrialized countries. 
 
Path-dependency and pre-1989 Employment Relations  
 
A premise of our argument is that current systems of ER in CEE are strongly embedded 
in the rationality of the pre-1989 institutional arrangements of labor governance. In particular, 
the present devolution of the governance of ER at the enterprise level is a resilient continuation 
of the ER characterizing the planned economy and of the successive attempts to enterprise 
reform. Specifically, we identify the common ER institutions, practices and routines in shaping 
change, that is, the sources of path-dependency.  
 
Starting in the mid 1960s—when the Stalinist model of socialist economy began to 
erode—enterprises were subject to numerous reforms that mirrored the varieties of socialism 
emergent in the region. The main challenge faced by the planners was that economic information 
was stocked at the enterprise level while the price mechanism was blocked and therefore did not 
help disseminate this information. As the economic information could not be released through 
the price mechanism and its substantial flexibilization was denied (Nove, 1977), planners turned 
attention to the working of the enterprise. Consequently, flexibilization in the operation of the 
enterprises was at the core of the reforms (Hare, Radice and Swain, 1981). It was believed that 
better managerial coordination inside state-owned enterprises (SOEs) would generate the much-
needed overall economic coordination that the plan failed to achieve. In terms of ER, a solution 
consisted in the design of complicated reward-systems at the enterprise level that moved away 
from the prevalent piecework pay system toward systems where the enterprise profit would 
represent the basis for base wage enhancement (Maresse, 1981; Petkov and Thirkell, 1991). This 
“incentive component” of the wage was expected to increase collective productivity at the 
enterprise level. However, the policy of full employment and centrally established restrictions on 
wage determination remained in place even in the most reform-oriented countries (Hungary in 
particular). This explains why for instance hiring, retention or termination HR practices were 
only an administrative formality.   
 
The 1970s and the 1980s witnessed the gradual transformation of socialist enterprises 
into autonomous economic entities. Albeit still in the overall context of a planned economy and 
in the absence of the free market mechanisms, the principle of self-management and enterprise 
autonomy in decision-making was accepted and adopted at various degrees by the existing 
Communist parties (Brus, 1990). This transformation reconfigured the relationship between labor 
and management inside the company as well as the relationship between state/party officials and 
the management of the SOEs. In fact, in countries that attempted to give substantive enterprise 
autonomy (such as Hungary, Poland and to a certain extent Bulgaria) the incipient differentiation 
of labor, management and the state as distinct actors of the ER systems proceeded the fall of 
communism. 
 
The fact that some HR practices were virtually non-existent in the East or that given the 
general economic framework in which they were supposed to operate there was no need to 
develop them at all, made the Eastern work context to increasingly diverge from the 
sophistication in HR practices achieved by developed industrialized countries. For instance, 
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managerial conceptions in the East were characterized as both “pre-Tayloristic” in the sense that 
they gave much informal autonomy to the worker and as fascinated with Taylorism in that they 
rejected real employee participation or empowerment (Thompson and Smith, 1992:4-8). 
 
The informality of ER was explained by the typical uncertainty with which enterprises 
had to cope under the planned economy. Reciprocal concessions between labor and management 
counterbalanced the uncertainty related to the alternation of periods of high and low production. 
Hence, a pattern of informal bargaining between labor and management developed as a 
mechanism of uncertainty-reduction.  At the same time, the enterprise – State relationships as 
mediated by the plan subdued the development of unions as institutions of workers interests’ 
representation. Unions played the role of mechanisms associated to the plan instrument. The 
literature describes them as “transmission belt” mechanisms for the high-level decisions taken by 
the communist parties that needed to be implemented at the enterprise level (Schienstock and 
Traxler, 1997). A major consequence, especially relevant for the post-1989 period, was the lack 
of industry level negotiations. Some countries introduced workers councils (for instance, 
Hungary and Poland) or adopted more participatory work systems such as the brigade-system 
(particularly relevant in Bulgaria) but these measures stopped halfway and were often 
formalistic. Consequently not only were ER at the enterprise level differently originated in the 
CEE countries versus the West, but they were also differently organized across the levels of the 
ER systems.  
 
In the next sections, we analyze the working of the three main factors triggering ER 
change in CEE in the period from planned to market economies and the role played by path-
dependent labor institutions in the framing of new ER systems in CEE. 
 
II. Privatization and the Transformation of ER Systems 
 
 Privatization of SOEs across CEE countries is a key factor of enterprise transformation, 
and so is the restructuring and commercialization of the SOEs prior to privatization. The 
empirical literature is ambiguous with respect to the causal relationship between privatization 
and ER change. Although the privatization of the SOEs and the parallel establishment of grass 
roots private enterprises changed the social, economic and legal context in which ER operated 
during the planned economy period, they are weak predictors of the direction and breadth of 
transformation in the systems of ER.  
 
Privatization mainly impacted the system of ER at the enterprise level, mostly regarding 
the introduction of HR practices. It also triggered some transformations at the national, macro-
level by repositioning the main actors of the ER systems above the level of the enterprise per se. 
The nature of the changes at these two distinct levels was quite different. The former were 
managerial in character, and contained in the private sphere of the enterprise, the latter related to 
the public domain and implied the legislative redefinition of political actors as the state, the 
unions, and employers’ organizations. Below we discuss them in detail. 
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Figure 1. Factors Shaping Employment Relations in Central and Eastern Europe Pre- and 
Post-1989 
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Transformations in the Structure of ER at the Enterprise Level as a Result of 
Privatization: The HR Function  
 
In addition to being a society-wide process of legal redefinition of the property rights in 
the former SOEs, privatization represents a realignment of the relationships between the 
previously less differentiated parties making up the personnel of the enterprises. Depending on 
the privatization method, management and labor became either shareholders or stakeholders in 
the company and the labor-management relationships were consequently redefined.  
 
Our analysis in this section is based on a thorough examination of the existing literature 
linking privatization to the process of ER transformation. A few but nevertheless, consistent 
studies offer a snapshot view to these processes and their mechanisms. There are two main 
directions to follow when analyzing the transformation of ER at the enterprise level as a result of 
privatization. First, under the impact of privatization the internal organizational structure of the 
enterprises was modified and in the process the role of the personnel department as inherited 
from the period of planned economy was altered. Second, privatization induced changes in the 
HR practices themselves.  
 
A main assumption in the literature for the early transition years was the direct positive 
relationship between property rights change and the transformation of ER. This simplified view 
of the transformation of ER ignored that organizational structures and routines under the planned 
economy needed to first be discontinued. From this perspective, one key process was the de-
politization of the personnel departments and their transformation into politically neutral 
divisions, with HR functions typical of companies operating under market rules (Soulsby and 
Clark, 1998). Surprisingly, the de-politization of the personnel departments was not accompanied 
by major changes in the managerial practices. It was generally a repositioning of the personnel 
department at lower levels of the enterprises’ organizational structures – a rebuke for its past 
collaboration with the communist parties structures (Koubek and Brewster, 1995). Not until the 
mid 1990s were personnel departments able to resurface as autonomous divisions inside the 
enterprise, although their role was always seen as mere personnel administration (Soulsby and 
Clark, 1998). For instance, studies done in the Czech Republic and Poland show that the HR 
departments were not involved in the firm’s strategic decision-making, and line managers 
overtook many of their functions (Koubek and Brewster, 1995; Tung and Havlovic, 1996). 
Hence, 
 
Proposition 1.  A direct consequence of the planned economy period which privatization 
could not automatically overcome is the marginal position assigned to HR departments in the 
privatized SOEs and the failure to integrate the HR function in enterprises’ overall business 
strategy.  
 
In addition to path-dependent mechanisms, the effects of privatization on ER are 
mediated by the quality of corporate governance arrangements put in place through privatization 
and the particular characteristics of the economic environments under which firms operate.  As 
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Thirkell, Petkov and Vickerstaff (1998) note, given the diversity of corporate governance 
structures and managerial strategies in the realm of ER, it is not surprising to simultaneously 
observe continuity in ER from state to private firms, and discontinuity and diversification of ER 
at the enterprise level. Over time, a general sense of differentiation emerged in terms of the 
effects of the privatization methods on the degree of ‘genuine change’ versus ‘path-dependency’ 
in the transformation of ER at enterprise level. Winiecky (2000) maintains that the most radical 
changes in ER occurred in the grass roots private sector, or what he labels the part of the 
economy “privatized from bellow”. This sector is largely non-unionized and has minimum 
barriers to change. By contrast, privatized SOEs displayed more inertia in the transformation of 
ER.  
 
We suggest that the privatization methods introduced diversity in ER mainly because of 
their different capacity to trigger overall enterprise restructuring. The corporate governance 
literature suggests that some privatization methods are structurally more likely to induce 
enterprise restructuring, while others are intrinsically more static. Table 1 summarizes the main 
and secondary methods of privatization pursued in the six CEE countries that we study. 
Management-buy-outs (MBO), and management-and-employee-buy-outs (MEBO) are insiders-
dominated privatization methods found to exacerbate the risk of disinvestment and lack of long-
term market strategy (Frydman, Pistor and Rapaczynski, 1996). For instance, employee 
shareholders are more likely to oppose restructuring plans that involve labor redundancies, may 
prefer less investment to higher wages, or opt for investments that minimize short-term risks 
(e.g. excessive product diversification) while exacerbating the possibility for longer term risks 
(Earle and Telegdy, 1998). On the management side, insiders-dominated privatization methods 
tend to increase the risk of opportunistic behaviors such as preference for job preservation, 
excessive wages for managers at the cost of under-investment and opaque information about firm 
performance (Wright, Filatotchev and Buck, 1997). While the employees might not have the 
required skills to exercise an effective supervisory role, old managers might have the “wrong” 
skills, such as ability to bargain with politicians but inability to deal with competitive market 
conditions (Ramamurti, 2000). 
 
Privatization methods that favor outsiders’ control and monitoring are generally more 
prone to restructuring. Nonetheless, given the structure of dispersed ownership that resulted from 
privatization, effective control depends on the development of related market institutions, in 
particular private-banking systems and the emergence of transparent financial markets. Countries 
differed markedly in their ability to set up these institutions. In addition, despite the fact that the 
available packages of privatization methods were similar, their composition and accessibility 
differed considerably from country to country. For instance, the role of FDI in enterprise 
restructuring was central in the case of Hungary, while much less important in the case of 
Romania or Bulgaria that attracted lower levels of FDI (see Table 1).  
 
 In sum, the corporate governance literature emphasizes that the main post-privatization 
pattern is the settlement of the ER governance institutions at the enterprise level with 
management in the driving-seat (King, 2001) and the weakening of the intermediary and national 
levels of ER systems. For instance, Cuervo and Villalonga’s (2000) model of privatization and 
organizational transformation placed management at the core of the endogenous changes of the 
post-socialist firms and defined privatization as a process filtered through and enacted by  
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Table 1.  Privatization in Six Central and Eastern European Countries by 2002 
 
 Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia 
Privatization 
stage (1) 
  
In process; 
private sector 
size: 
71.7 % of gross 
value added 
73.4% of 
employment 
 
Advanced; 
private sector 
size:  75% of 
GDP 
Almost 
complete; 
private 
sector size: 
80% of GDP 
 
Advanced; 
private sector 
size: over 
70% of GDP 
70% of 
employment 
In 
process; 
private 
sector 
size: 
67.1% of 
GDP 
67% of 
employme
nt 
Advanced; 
Private 
sector size: 
85% of 
GDP 
Main/ 
Secondary 
privatization 
method (2) 
Voucher 
/direct sales 
Voucher/ 
direct sales 
FDI/ 
MBO 
 
MEBO/ 
Direct sales 
MEBO/ 
voucher 
Direct  
sales/ 
voucher 
Role of FDI 
in enterprise 
restructuring 
(1) 
Restricted Important Main tool of 
enterprise 
restructuring 
Important 
after 1995 
Restricted  Relatively 
important 
Size of Small 
and Medium 
Enterprises 
Sector (1) 
45% of GDP* 
65% of labor 
force 
42% of GDP 
60% of labor 
force 
45% of GDP 
70% of 
labor force 
50% of GDP 
67% of labor 
force 
 
47% of 
labor 
force 
58% of 
GDP* 
60% of 
labor force 
Source: (1) Based on the 2002 Regular Reports on the candidate countries progress towards accession; (2) Hunya 
(2000) * Data come from the 2000 Regular Reports on the candidate countries progress towards accession 
 
management. Still, the central role assigned to management in the process of privatization was 
chiefly a reinforcement of the power it gained during the pre-1989 enterprise reforms (Shleifer 
and Vasiliev, 1996).   
 
The ER literature in CEE, points in the same direction and stresses the subordination of 
ER transformations to management-triggered restructuring of the enterprise (Martin, 1998; 
Martin and Cristesco-Martin, 1999; Neumann, 1997). This occurred via the commercialization of 
the enterprises during the early transition period (Egorov, 1996), insider-dominated ownership 
forms (Vickerstaff and Thirkell, 2000), voucher privatization (Martin, 1997; Standing, 1997), 
FDI, and the emergence of a large sector of small and medium enterprises across the CEE 
economies encompassing mainly a non-unionized labor-force (Casale, 1999; Pollert, 2000). Even 
in Hungary, the country that has most vigorously adopted the works councils, management 
remained the main actor shaping ER at the enterprise level (Neumann, 1997; Toth, 1997).  Yet, 
the shift of the control in decision-making toward management as a result of dispersed 
privatization or what some scholars call “the managerialization” of the CEE economies (King, 
2001) was not automatically accompanied by a radical change towards Western HR practices.  
 
A large number of authors highlight the continuity of “communists” HR practices from 
state to private enterprises, and the slow pace at which new, Western HR practices are introduced 
(Kovach, 1995; Martin, 1999). Many of the privatized firms continued to be relatively 
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centralized and rigid, to have high levels of social closeness, extensive informality, ambiguous 
authority relationships, and little differentiation between skill levels.  In comparison to their 
Western counterparts, they had underdeveloped recruitment, promotion, performance appraisal, 
and termination practices (Clark and Soulsby, 1999; Koubek and Brewster, 1995; Tung and 
Havlovic, 1996) 1.   
 
The fact that former ER structures are so resilient to change even under privatization 
arrangements that favor overall enterprise restructuring is partly explained by path-dependent 
mechanisms. Managerial- and work-related behaviors are based on routines and practices that 
coagulate into taken-for-granted ideational frameworks difficult to change (Campbell and 
Pedersen, 1996). In addition, the link between HR management and firm financial performance 
was not well understood. Consequently, HR departments and their practices were low priority at 
least in the first part of the transition period.  
 
Only under certain circumstances did ER change. Empirical studies show that even the 
most “sticky” routines may change under strong competitive environmental pressures. For 
example, in their study on ER in the Hungarian industry, Whitley and Czaban (1998) conclude 
that the transfer of property from state to private hands as such was not a good predictor of the 
degree of change in ER at the enterprise level, but that exogenous, macro-environmental changes 
such as increased market competition pressured for the change of the ER inside the firm.  A 
surprising finding was that supervisor-employee relations, usually regarded as strongly inertial, 
changed more radically in crisis SOEs and foreign-owned firms than in stable SOEs, or in private 
firms (i.e. owned by Hungarian citizens). SOEs on the verge of losing their domestic market 
share, and foreign-owned firms exposed to competitive market pressures were more likely to 
introduce participative work practices, decentralize decision-making and give supervisors 
autonomy in decision-making. In the same vein, Slomp, van Hoof and Moerel singled out 
privatization as “the only factor having an impact on industrial relations” (1996:343). But they 
point out that this is due not only to changes in ownership status as such but also to the macro-
environmental changes resulting from privatization. Given that ERs at firm level are more likely 
to be inertial and dependent on logics of actions inherited from the planned economy period, we 
expect that pressures exercised by the enterprises’ market environment to play an important role 
in their restructuring. Hence,  
 
Proposition 2.  Across privatization methods, privatization shifts the authority in the 
governance of ER towards management but does not lead to major transformations in firms’ HR 
practices, unless strong exogenous, macro-environmental pressures are present. 
 
Transformations at the Industry- and National Levels of ER as a Result of Privatization: 
Tripartism in CEE 
 
There exists a vast amount of literature describing the establishment of tripartite systems 
in CEE and their raison d’être in the turbulent context of the transition to market-based 
economies (Martin, 1997; Standing, 1997; Pollert, 2000; Cox and Mason, 2000). Hethy defines 
tripartism as a variety of ‘neo-corporatism’, a mechanism of “high-level negotiations between 
the state and the representatives of employers and labor” (1994: 312). In the CEE context, 
tripartism provided a national level framework to negotiate the privatization process and its large 
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redistribution of assets. Yet, several authors attribute the establishment of tripartite structures to 
the pressure of international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, and the International Labor Organization, active in these countries during the transition 
period (Hethy, 1994; Flanagan, 1998; Thirkell et al., 1998). Still other authors suggest that 
tripartism was adopted to conform to the European Union labor standards, as a precondition for 
accession and point out that post-1989 governments in CEE were often reluctant to their 
implementation (Standing, 1997; Myant, Slolock and Smith, 2000).  In part, this was due to the 
decreasing popularity of such institutions in Western countries (Flanagan, 1998).  
 
It is important to note that beyond the conceptual resemblance, there are intrinsic 
characteristics of tripartism in CEE differentiating it sharply from its Western counterpart (Toth, 
1997). First, tripartite structures were implemented from the top and parallel to firm 
restructuring. Second, the “high-level” character of the negotiations between the three social 
actors was flawed by the estrangement of the national level tripartite negotiations from the labor 
strategies pursued by the companies. Third, effective tripartism required a clear redefinition of 
the role of the state, unions and employers’ organization within the ER systems, and a break 
from the practices of the communist period. However, as several authors noted this break either 
did not occur or adopted unexpected forms (Flanagan, 1998; Martin, 1997). In sum, each party in 
the tripartite model introduced specific types of strains.  
 
A common feature and a benchmark of tripartism across CEE during the 1990s was the 
fact that the state-, labor unions-, and employers’ organizations were not “actors” in the real 
sense of the term, but in fact, bundles of dynamic processes. Their functioning structure was still 
far from being stabilized, or from presenting operational routines even toward the end of the 
‘transition’ decade. Table 2 presents the level of union and employers organizations 
fragmentation across the six CEE countries by 1998 showing this diversity. Below we discuss 
the specific tensions introduced within the tripartite structures by each of its actors. 
 
The State as a Tripartite Actor. The tensions originating in the position of the state within 
the tripartite structures are probably the most powerful. When tripartite structures were first 
introduced in CEE, the expectation was that the state will play only a limited role and that most 
of the negotiations will take place between the representatives of labor and management (Slomp 
et al. 1996, Cox and Mason 2000). However, given its critical role in the process of privatization 
and in the coordination of the macro-stabilization reforms, the state remained central to the 
tripartite structures. In fact, as the Czech and Slovak experiences clearly exemplify, the extent to 
which tripartism gained a higher profile at various points in time, depended strongly on the 
government’ general attitude towards corporatist economic coordination (Myant et al., 2000). 
This seems to be a trend typical not only in the CEE transition economies but, more broadly, a 
characteristic of developing economies that rely on state-lead policies of economic growth 
(Zapata, 1996). Other authors point to the fact that the centrality of the state within tripartite 
negotiations was enhanced by attitudinal patterns inherited from the past. Partly because the role 
of the state used to be central in solving their problems, and partly because unions (Neumann, 
2002) and employers’ organizations were perceived as weak and ineffective structures (Slomp et 
al., 1996) employees continued to direct their demands to the state.  
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Table 2. Structure of Trade Unions Organizations and Employers’ Organizations in Six CEE 
countries 
 
 Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia 
Estimated 
unionization level by 
1996-1997 (% of 
employed labor 
force) (1)  
37%  
(1995) 
37%   
 
45% 
(1995)* 
40% 
 
50%   50% 
Number of unions 
(U), union 
federations (UF) & 
union 
confederations (UC) 
(2) 
2 UC 
4 UF 
- One large 
UC with 30 
member trade 
unions 
- 11 smaller 
UC 
6 UC 2 UF** -Over 20 
UC of 
which:  
2 largest 
UC have 
each 5880 
and 2140 
U 
 
-One UC 
with 41 U 
-3 smaller 
UCs 
-8 
independe
nt trade 
union 
branches 
 
Number of 
employers’ 
organizations  (2) 
EO- employer 
organization 
EC- employer 
confederation 
 
4 main 
EOs in 
one 
associatio
n 
-2 large EC of 
ECs with 7, 
and 
respectively 21 
member 
federations 
10 EC 1 main 
EC, 
& several 
other 
confederat
ions & 
organizati
ons of 
varying 
size 
5 national 
EOs 
1 EC with 
39 EOs 
Source:  (1) Standing (1997: 140-150); (2) Casale, ed.  (1999)  Note: * Data for Hungary come from Thirkell et al. 
(1998: 86);  ** Data for Poland come from Cox and Mason (2000: 334-335) 
 
Old “Transmission Belt” Unions and New Unions as Members of the Tripartite 
Structures.  Another major source of conflict within the CEE tripartite structures comes from the 
unions’ position in the tripartite negotiations. Studies done in the region describe the general 
tendency toward fragmentation in the union movements (Standing, 1997; Cox and Mason, 2000), 
the conflict between old and new unions (Martin, 1997; Pollert, 1999), and the direct 
involvement of unions in the political life (Cox and Mason, 2000; Pollert, 2000). The result is a 
trend toward decreasing popularity of unions in CEE (Martin, 1999).  Blanchflower and 
Freeman’s (1997) analysis of attitudes toward unions revealed much lower levels of satisfaction 
with unions among Eastern employees than their Western counterparts, and point out the paradox 
that although much more dissatisfied with unions, employees in the East shared the 
overwhelming opinion that unions have too little power. They attribute these contradictory 
findings to the communist legacy of labor relations and to the peculiar role played by unions in 
the planned economy system - “transmission belts” mechanisms for the high-level decisions 
taken by the communist parties that needed to be implemented at the enterprise level. That is, the 
passivity of former trade unions and their lack of legitimacy as representatives of employees’ 
interests continued after 1989. Another explanation of unions’ ineffectiveness inside tripartite 
structures is advanced by the studies of Slomp et al. (1996) and Pollert (2000) who discuss the 
issue of divergence of eastern tripartism from its Western models. Their answer to the question 
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of why states remain strong in the tripartite structures of the East is that the intermediary level of 
tripartite systems (industry level negotiations) is the missing element of tripartism in the ex-
communist countries of Europe.  
 
Employers’ organizations as members of tripartite structures.  The most uniform 
phenomenon accompanying the emergence of tripartism in CEE was the slow formation of 
employers’ organizations and their lack of substantive involvement in the tripartite structures 
(MacShane, 1994; Cox and Mason, 2000). Generally speaking, employers remained focused on 
company-level agreements and saw little need for industry- or national level negotiations 
(Egorov, 1996; Martin, 1999). The privatization processes seemed to further accelerate this 
trend. Managers of privately owned companies, and especially those newly formed were 
reluctant to accept unions in their companies and to get involved in employers’ organizations at 
the industry level. Country-specific studies (Pollert, 1999; Hill, Martin, and Vidinova, 1997) 
show that often the role of employers’ organization has been appropriated by the Chambers of 
Commerce (Slomp et al., 1996) and mostly as a government effort to comply with the tripartite 
structures requested by international organizations, the ILO in particular (Standing, 1997). This 
further weakened the intermediary level of the tripartite systems and accentuated the polarization 
of the ER systems between the national and enterprise levels.  
 
As has been observed in the case of developed economies, employer strategies in the 
realm of ER follow logics of action that respond to global competitive pressures faced at firm 
level. In CEE, privatization opened the economies abruptly to global competition, before the 
erection of any institutions of corporatist coordination was consolidated. In consequence, 
employer strategies in CEE are closer to what Thelen (2001) described for advanced 
industrialized countries like Britain and the United States as segmentalist ER strategies. As 
opposed to “collectivist” strategies, segmentalist strategies characterize market economies that 
have traditionally weak labor market coordinating institutions above the enterprise level. In such 
countries the employers are compelled to stabilize the firms’ labor market environment through 
atomized, firm-based negotiations. Short of labor market coordinating institutions above the 
enterprise level, and faced with strong open-market competition, employer strategies in CEE 
subscribed to segmentalism from the very beginning of the transition period. In light of this 
discussion, we propose: 
 
Proposition 3.  The pivotal role of the State in the process of privatization and economic 
restructuring reinforces its historically strong position in the CEE systems of ER and its weight 
in the outcomes of tripartite collective bargaining. 
 
Proposition 4.  Path-dependent barriers to the establishment of unions and employers’ 
organizations undermine the formation of corporatist structures of ER models in CEE and 
relegate collective bargaining negotiations to the national level while short-circuiting the 
intermediary level of decision-making. 
 
III. Foreign Direct Investment and the Transformation in ER Systems  
 
In this section, we discuss foreign direct investment (FDI) as an autonomous factor 
influencing the transformation of ER in CEE.  Three main reasons make FDI critical. First, FDI 
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brings into the picture the role of multinational companies (MNCs) as main agents of change and 
globalization. This aspect is particularly relevant in the CEE context, where for over four 
decades foreign-owned companies were almost completely absent from the economic 
environment of the planned economies. For instance, in 1987 the total FDI in the six CEE 
countries and former East Germany was estimated in the range of 200 to 500 million US dollars 
(UN, 1989: 20-21) while the average FDI inflows for the period 1997-2001 range between 708 
million ECU in Bulgaria and 6664 million ECU in Poland (European Commission, 2002). 
Second, as compared with insiders-dominated privatization methods, FDI was regarded as the 
primary ground for the transfer of foreign managerial skills and tacit knowledge difficult to be 
acquired otherwise (Estrin, Hughes and Todd, 1997; Kogut, 1996). Third, positive spillover 
effects to the broader economy were expected to follow as a result of the diffusion of managerial 
and organizational knowledge from foreign-owned companies to the local companies.   
 
By its influence on managerial practices, FDI transformed the ER systems mainly at the 
enterprise level. Nevertheless, given the usually anti-union stance adopted by the majority of 
MNCs, it also impacted unionism and levels of unionization across the region.  In other words, 
similar to other privatization methods, FDI strengthened the enterprise-based character of ER in 
CEE and weakened the influence of corporatist tendencies imprinted by concurrent processes or 
international institutions. However, despite the importance assigned to MNCs in the CEE 
economies, there are surprisingly few empirical studies that analyze their influence on ER 
systems. 
 
The transfer of HR practices in the CEE work context as a result of FDI 
 
It is largely accepted that MNCs revived or introduced new HR practices inexistent 
during the planned economy. For example, MNCs were fast to launch recruiting, evaluation, 
training, compensation, and benefits practices that in the past received little attention. Whereas 
some studies suggest that foreign affiliates are more likely to follow local HR practices than to 
adopt the HR practices of the parent company (Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994), in CEE 
subsidiaries of MNCs tend to be perceived as islands of Westernized HR management practices 
and therefore differ from local firms.  
 
A few studies analyzed the internal mechanisms of HR practices’ transfer, and pointed to 
characteristics of the parent companies that favored such transfers. Cyr and Schneider (1996) 
analyzed the process of organizational learning and actual transfer of HR practices in CEE joint 
venture companies. Drawing their conclusions on the systematic research of HR practices in 
three joint ventures established in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic with Swedish, 
French, and German capital respectively, they emphasize the importance of shared responsibility, 
training, and well-designed reward systems for the process of organizational learning and 
behavioral change at the enterprise level. Important findings were that unlearning of an old 
organizational culture occurs through sustained training and teamwork. The long-lasting 
behavioral pattern of risk and responsibility avoidance inherited from the period of planned 
economy was found to be decreasing with training and improved communication inside the 
company.  
 
Another internal mechanism with a seemingly important impact on the transfer of HR 
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managerial practices in CEE is the use of expatriates. Previous research showed that the presence 
of expatriates facilitates the transfer of HR managerial practices within MNCs and boosts their 
departure from local practices (Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994). In CEE, the expatriates played a 
major role in the socialization of the locals in the organizational culture and practices of the 
parent companies. Peiperl and Estrin (1998) estimated that, managerial markets across the CEE 
were tight, and that there was consequently high reliance on expatriates in the case of foreign-
owned and joint ventures firms. Nonetheless, the use of expatriates tends to decrease over time 
and that seems to be already the case in most of the CEE subsidiaries. Peterson (2003) found that 
the use of expatriates in CEE is declining, given that functional expertise and organizational 
culture have been already transferred to local managers, but that the transfer of HR practices 
remains mainly circumvented to the subsidiaries. The broader spillover effects to local 
companies are limited, because the managerial markets are highly segmented with little 
circulation of managers from the MNC’s subsidiaries to the local companies.  
 
One of the few studies that paid attention to the characteristics of the MNCs in 
connection to the transfer of HR managerial practices is Bluhm’s (2001) analysis of the 
conjugate home country/host country effects in the case of 27 German manufacturing firms 
established in Poland and the Czech Republic. Bluhm finds that the intensity of managerial 
transfer was best predicted by firm size. Large MNCs were more likely to transfer, or creatively 
adapt HR practices pursued at home, whereas small firms followed more the existent national 
practices. Despite the limited representativity of Bluhm’s sample, the study suggests that the 
characteristics of the MNCs present in the region introduce diversity in the HR practices 
followed by the subsidiaries.  
 
We would argue that the adoption of the parent company’s HR practices depends, 
however, on a much wider range of factors, the influence of which has not yet been assessed in 
the case of MNCs operating in the CEE countries. Such factors refer to the entry mode, the type 
of market in which the parent company operates (global versus isolated domestic markets), the 
extent to which HR management is regarded as a strategic component in the parent company, the 
cultural distance between the home and host country, the level of enterprise de-politization and 
the overall legal and political environment of the host country. 
 
The Effect of FDI on Unionism in CEE 
 
Several empirical studies confirm that FDI weakened trade unionism and contributed to 
the enforcement of management authority at the firm level. In Hungary, Toth (1997) and 
Neumann (1997) show that more often than not management in foreign-owned companies 
adopted a hostile attitude toward unions, and that in multinational companies the labor force is 
largely non-unionized.  Referring to Bulgaria where management discretion at the firm level was 
somewhat more contrived by law than in other CEE countries, Hill et al. (1997) states that 
unions’ position is more at question in firms with foreign participation and that embryonic 
‘managerialism’ is more likely to appear in multinational companies.  Martin (1997) finds that in 
the Czeck Republic, elements of new HR practices (such as individual-pay determination) are 
more likely to exist in multinational companies and that foreign participation above 30 percent 
takes firms out of the incidence of the Wage Act (i.e. wage levels are no longer established 
through collective bargaining).  Finally, Pollert (1997) also documents the weak bargaining 
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position of unions in MNCs in the Czech Republic, although she signals differences depending 
on the MNC’s country of origin.  
 
Although all these studies point in the same direction, it is not clear whether the fact that 
MNCs in CEE are largely non-unionized is the result of an organized effort to block the 
establishment of unions within their subsidiaries. A major set-back for the establishment of 
unions was that wages in the subsidiaries were by far superior to those negotiated through 
collective bargaining at the industry level, or to the national minimum wages established by 
tripartite negotiations. Shop-floor negotiations in MNCs were targeted towards flexibility, and in 
particular, towards attracting a superior work force.  In light of this literature, we propose: 
 
Proposition 5.  CEE countries that attracted higher levels of FDI will have more 
heterogeneous and decentralized ER systems that are less influenced by tripartite arrangements 
and will display more diversified HR practices at the firm level. 
 
Proposition 6.  The presence of MNCs reinforces the managerial character of ER at the 
level of the enterprise and pressures for de-unionization and the weakening of incipient 
corporatist arrangements at the industry- and national levels. 
 
IV.  The “Europeanization” of the ER Systems in CEE: European Union Enlargement and 
the Social Acquis 
 
An increasingly critical factor for the structuring of new systems of ER in CEE is the 
process of European Union (EU) enlargement and the adoption by the CEE countries of the 
acquis communautaire - the body of EU legislation - as a pre-condition for accession2. At the 
policy level, Atkinson (2002) points out that the reactivation of EU’s social agenda at the Lisbon 
European Council in March 2000 was at least partially due to the perspective of enlargement and 
that the move was more preemptive than accommodating. The enlargement process requires the 
establishment of isomorphic institutions at the national level of the ER systems and pressures 
toward more corporatist arrangements at the sub-national levels. Consequently, it is the most 
challenging factor to the path-dependence hypothesis of ER transformation in CEE.  
 
Notably, unlike other transition or developing economies, the CEE countries face the 
unique task to adapt to the institutionalized structure of ER of developed EU economies. We 
argue that the extent to which ER in CEE will continue to operate under a specific type of 
tripartite relationships, and to devolve the governance of the employment relations at the 
enterprise level will depend to a large extent on two factors: (a) the evolution of ER and 
integration paths of current EU members, this is, the enlargement context, and (b) the conditions 
for enlargement required in the realm of the so-called third, i.e. social pillar. 
 
The rest of this section discusses the implications of enlargement for the institutions of 
labor governance in CEE. The analysis will first outline the enlargement context in the realm of 
ER, and second it will chart the main policy tools employed, and the potential consequences of 
the enlargement process for the ER systems in CEE. 
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The Enlargement Context 
 
The idea of a pan-European “system” of industrial relations has only recently gained 
more contours in the debates about the future of labor governance in an economically and 
politically integrated Europe. The 1990s represented a period in which the EU’s social 
dimension, only vaguely affirmed in the Treaty of Rome, received legal grounding and strong 
institutional support. A number of developments such as the 1989 Social Charter, the atypical 
work and parental leave directives of the early 1990s (Jensen, Madsen and Due, 1999), the 1995 
European Works Council directive (Teague, 1999; Addison and Siebert, 1999), and the 
implementation of National Actions Plans for Employment  (NAPs) starting in 1997-1998 
(Leonard, 2001; Biagi, 1999) are repeatedly pointed out as key steps toward the creation of a 
European system of industrial relations and harmonization in the social dimension. A pick 
moment was the inclusion of a proper “employment chapter” in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. 
As a consequence the narrow legal basis for action in social matters afforded by the Treaty of 
Rome was extended to expressly include the social dimension. 
 
Although recent developments indicate increasing coordination on labor-related issues at 
the European level (Jensen et al., 1999; Teague, 2001) there are no clear convergence trends 
toward a common institutional design of labor governance among the present EU members 
(Marginson and Sisson, 2002). Some authors argue that none should be expected any time soon 
(Streeck, 1998; Roche, 2000). This makes the task of identifying the concrete ways in which the 
EU enlargement will affect the functioning of the CEE systems of ER the more difficult. 
Whereas the economic convergence criteria are clearly defined, and their economic rationality 
accepted, the impact of EU models of labor governance and of the social acquis is difficult to 
assess in abstractness. Moreover, even if such evaluations could be arguably made, the top down 
implementation of the acquis and of ER models anchored in corporatist arrangements leaves the 
enforceability matter still widely open. Nevertheless, one issue is clear: unlike in the case of the 
current EU members, the accession countries cannot opt-out from the acquis. Therefore, the 
pressure to conform to the present acquis is, in a sense, stronger than for the current member-
states (Grabbe, forthcoming).  
 
The Influence of Enlargement on the CEE Systems of ER 
 
The adoption of the social acquis was seen as a linear process to be gradually 
implemented by all the candidate countries before accession. Its legalistic approach ruled out the 
possibility of more differentiated routes to enlargement based on public versus market failure 
analyses to social policy adoption (Addison and Siebert, 1999). Below we discuss the main 
policy tools for the adoption of the EU social acquis. 
 
The main tools for the coordination of the candidate countries’ employment policies are 
the “Joint Assessment Papers” (JAPs) signed by the candidate countries with the European 
Commission in the period 2000-2002. The JAPs are country-specific documents aimed at 
identifying and evaluating the measures to be undertaken by each candidate country in order to 
fully implement the Employment Title of the Amsterdam Treaty. The JAPs were structured 
along two distinct dimensions: an evaluation of the local market characteristics and, a set of 
policy recommendations to be adopted in order to align the employment policies of the candidate 
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countries with the European Employment Strategy. Policy recommendations cover broad areas 
such as wage settlement, the reform of the tax and benefits systems, human resources 
development and training, the gender gap and minority issues. 
 
The similitude of policy recommendations across countries is striking. It reveals the 
Commission’s uniform view regarding the necessary labor market institutions to be put in place 
in each of the candidate countries.  A large number of recommendations address the 
development of national level labor institutions such as the PES (Public Employment Services), 
the representative national institutions to deal with the ESF (European Structural Funds), the 
main agencies to design and monitor the implementation of ALMPs (Active Labor Market 
Policies) and, the monitoring institution for the implementation of the acquis in the area of health 
and safety at work (usually Labor Inspectorates). At this early stage, it is difficult to assess the 
effectiveness of these institutions. The question still remains whether what is now part of the law 
will effectively shape the structuring of ER at enterprise- or sector level. In a sense the JAPs 
mirror a similar exercise initiated by the Commission for the current member states in 1997-1998 
in the form of National Action Plans for Employment (NAPs). Hence, taking a closer look at the 
literature analyzing the NAPs may partially reveal some of the assumptions and potential 
consequences of the JAPs in the Eastern context.  
 
The NAPs represent a concrete instrument by which the European Commission 
influences the national level employment policies. The guidelines of the NAPs are established by 
the Commission and the member-states have to report back annually the progress made toward 
meeting a number of targets. Several assumptions implicit in the way in which the European 
Commission has set up the process of NAPs elaboration have been already questioned and 
analyzed in the literature. The concerns raised in the context of the present member states are 
potentially relevant for the CEE countries as well.  For instance, Leonard (1999:32) points to the 
fact that NAPS are essentially a government project as opposed to union or employer motivated, 
and that they operate under an implicit assumption of the existence of corporatist national 
systems of industrial relations.  
 
The assumption of a corporatist labor environment in CEE would come in sharp 
contradiction with reality. Thus, it seems reasonable to ask what present features of ER in CEE 
would be enforced or weakened by evolutions similar to those presently taking place in the EU. 
In particular, would the existing cleavages between the East and the West in the realm of ER be 
pushed even further? Paradoxically, the efforts toward integration on the social dimension 
among the present member states could reinforce the divergent trajectory of ER systems in the 
accession countries. One major implication of the parallel evolutions in the EU is that a 
prolongation of the strong role of the state in national tripartite bargaining may be expected as a 
result of JAPs’ introduction. As the CEE governments struggle to align their institutions and 
legislative structures to the EU standards and the acquis, the role of the state in regulating the 
labor markets and institutions will increase rather than diminish.  
 
The 2002 Regular Reports towards Accession as well as a number of other documents 
issued by the Commission are almost unanimous in noting that the corporatist institutions of 
social partnership are weak in the CEE countries. However because the “catching up” approach3 
is seen as adequate not only in economic matters but also in the realm of ER institutions, the 
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current recommendation is to strengthen the tripartite- and especially bipartite dialogue at the 
sector and enterprise levels, as well as to extend the reach of collective agreements in the private 
sector, including small and medium sized enterprises4. It is not clear how this institutional 
convergence will be achieved in practice but it is transparent that the expectation is that trends 
will be largely reversed and that unionization levels and participation in employers’ 
organizations will increase. As Meardi (2002) in one of the rare articles analyzing the 
consequences of the EU eastward enlargement puts it:  
 
“ […] since 1999 an effort has been made to include social dialogue, as a constitutive part 
of the acquis communautaire, in the enlargement process […]. Yet this effort remains rather 
abstract, at most a sort of ‘apolitical’ institutional engineering with little link to actual industrial 
relations conflicts. […] Here, it is possible to identify the same problem which has undermined 
‘tripartism’ in the CEE: the creation of façade institutions before effective social partners exist” 
(81-82). 
 
The uniform approach taken by the Commission for the adoption of the social acquis by 
the candidate countries may explain its almost complete translation in the candidate countries’ 
legislation, most often without any requirements for transitional arrangements. Hence, 
 
Proposition 7.  ER systems in the CEE accession countries will continue to be strongly 
affected by the evolution of the EU acquis in the social and employment domain, especially at the 
national level. 
 
Proposition 8.  The process of European integration may further reinforce the role of the 
State in the structuring of ER in CEE without contributing to the strengthening of the other 
social actors of the ER systems.  
 
Proposition 9.  The extent to which the social acquis will influence the sector, and 
company bargaining levels depends on the development of corporatist institutions and 
instruments of collective negotiations that are not a natural outgrowth of the ER traditions in 
CEE. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this article we proposed a three-level framework for the analysis of the transformation 
of ER systems in CEE, and argued that this conceptualization leads to a better understanding of 
the level-specific processes and mechanisms of change. We discussed the effects of three main 
triggers of ER transformation: privatization, FDI, and EU enlargement. By an in depth analysis 
of the existing literature, we show that privatization and FDI have a stronger impact on the 
transformation of ER at the enterprise level, while the prospect of the EU enlargement fosters the 
structuring of new industry, and national institutions of ER.  
 
Path-dependent transformation is a key characteristic of ER systems in CEE with the 
consequence that the present systems of ER diverge from Western long-established corporatist 
patterns. Unlike in Western Europe where a similar process of ER deregulation and wage-
bargaining decentralization began in the mid 1980s (Thelen, 2001), post-1989 privatization and 
globalization processes in CEE only strengthened a two-decade old trend for enterprise-centered 
systems of ER. In fact, we conclude that ER systems in CEE represent unsettled cases of 
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interference between ER strategies characteristic to systems of liberal and coordinated market 
economies. The result is so far a hybrid form of these ER systems. Whereas employers 
subscribed to segmentalist ER based at the firm level, the national level, under the pressure to 
integrate in the EU, upheld corporatist ER strategies. But, the characteristics of liberal or 
corporatist Western models of ER were not closely reproduced at any of the levels of the CEE 
systems of ER. On one side, employer segmentalist strategies were not supported by a strong 
tradition of HR practices for the governance of the employment relationship at the firm level. On 
the other side, the corporatist regulation of the ER systems did not rely on a strong intermediate 
level of ER coordination. Nevertheless, as we tried to document the ER systems in CEE are 
rapidly evolving under the influence of a host of internal and international pressures. From this 
perspective, the way in which domestic actors will balance the “Europenization” and 
“globalization” pressures remains an open question.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 This evidence goes against the thesis sometimes advanced in the literature that CEE is experiencing the 
‘Americanization’ of ER (Meardi, 2002; Marginson and Sisson, 2002). Such opinions point to the extreme 
decentralization of collective bargaining and to the enterprise basis of unions as the sole indicator of 
‘Americanization’. However, these characteristics are not accompanied by sophisticated HR practices largely 
characterizing the U.S. ER environment. Nor have unions in CEE been able to replicate the classic ‘economic’ or 
‘business unionism’ in Gompers’ tradition. See Ost (2002) for a discussion on the relevance of business unionism in 
post-communist CEE.  
2 With the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, full EU membership is envisaged for the CEE countries in 2004. 
Romania and Bulgaria have the objective to join in 2007. 
3 The Report of the High Level Group on Industrial Relations and Change in the European Union states: “Economic 
convergence in itself is not enough. It should be accompanied by progressive convergence in the social field. […] 
This highly ambitious project cannot be realized without the full involvement and commitment of the social 
partners” (2002:11). See also section “Catching-up process for candidate countries” p. 21-22 in the same report. 
4 See Chapter 13: Social policy and employment in each of the Commission’s Regular Reports on the Progress 
toward Accession of the candidate countries. 
 
